Sectoral aid and urban crime victimization in Papua New Guinea

Gerard Guthrie

Abstract

The purpose of AusAID’s 2003-2009 Law and Justice Sector Program (LJSP) was to develop the capacity of Papua New Guinea’s law and justice agencies to implement consistent policy, priorities and plans. This article assesses whether the approach had a flow-on effect by contributing to a reduction in community crime victimization. Extensive urban crime victimization surveys from 2004-2008 found no apparent flow-ons. National levels of individual and household victimization did not change significantly. Victimization types were similar, but levels varied considerably between towns. Port Moresby was close to the national mean and steady. Perceived increases in violent crime were consistent only with considerable localized fluctuations in different areas rather than statistically significant underlying changes. Restorative justice mechanisms were limited in scope. AusAID’s Independent Completion Report too found that LJSP service delivery was problematic. While the Report nonetheless supported the sectoral approach as a homegrown initiative, this article questions its relevance. The lack of significant reductions in crime victimization implies that, local or not, the bureaucratic sectoral approach was a diversion from the real community issues.

Key words: Aid project evaluation, Australian aid, crime victimization, law and justice sector program, Papua New Guinea, sectoral aid

Introduction

Papua New Guinea has long had a well-developed reputation for crime, both within the country and internationally (Clifford et al. 1984; UNDP/ILO 1993; UNDP 2004). By early this century, the impact of crime on governance was a major concern, especially in Australia in the context of 9/11, consistent with Dinnen’s (1997, p. 245) view that, ‘lawlessness and violence in many parts of Papua New Guinea … present a growing challenge to the authority of the state’. A second concern was that crime might affect international investment and economic growth, consistent with World Bank findings in the 1990’s about a relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction and 1996 World Bank research which estimated that 33.5% of the rural population and 11.4% of the urban population were living in poverty (Gibson & Rozelle 2002, pp. 4-6). A third concern was with the effects of crime on the community, allied to an interest in locally-adapted approaches, including restorative rather than retributive justice (Dinnen 1997) and village courts (Goddard 2002).
These intertwined concerns were articulated in a review by AusAID (2003). Recent economic contraction in PNG contrasted with a high population growth rate, significant provincial disparities, lawlessness and instability compounding inability to attract investment, increasingly sophisticated forms of corruption linked to poor governance, and a need for institutional and policy reform. The review observed that, ‘the capacity and accountability of core national institutions has deteriorated ... if the institutions responsible for governance quality are allowed to wither, social and economic prospects become seriously impaired (p. 6) .... A key challenge in the short to medium term is the capacity of law and order institutions to maintain their impartiality and effectiveness … Over the longer term, strong police, legal and judicial systems in large part determine the capacity of countries to combat corruption, achieve growth and attract foreign investment’ (p. 9).

Australian aid to law and justice agencies increased considerably from this time, initially associated with a widespread package of governance measures under the Enhanced Cooperation Program (Guthrie & Kawi 2004, pp. 1-3; Hawksley 2006, pp. 170-171; Macdonald 2008, pp. 6-8). The main activity was the Law & Justice Sector Program (LJSP) managed by Cardno ACIL, ultimately at a cost of some AUD150 million from 2003-2009 (Murphy & Gramckow 2010, p. 1). This program aimed at a coordinated approach among the agencies defined as comprising the sector for national planning purposes. In its logical framework terminology, the overriding Goal in the Project Design Document was ‘to move towards a more just, safe and secure society for all people in PNG’. At the Purpose level, this was to be achieved by developing the capacity of law and justice agencies and their partners to implement law and justice policy, sector priorities and plans (Murphy & Gramckow 2010, Annex 2, pp. 31-32).

Despite finding comprehensive shortcomings with the sectoral approach, the recent AusAID LJSP Independent Completion Report (ICR – Murphy & Gramckow 2010) supported it. This makes it timely to revisit findings from surveys conducted by the AusAID-funded Justice Advisory Group (JAG), in partnership with the National Research Institute from 2004 to 2007 and the Law & Justice Sector Secretariat from November 2007 to 2008. The surveys contributed to sectoral monitoring, to assess whether the sectoral approach of agency capacity building at the Purpose level had a flow-on effect at the Goal level by contributing to a reduction in community crime victimization. The assessment draws on 16 urban crime victimization surveys in eight cities and towns over the five years 2004-2008, which were statistically representative of PNG towns. The article draws primarily on a synthesis that used the best available data from each location to provide, with some limitations, the most realistic and comprehensive estimates of urban household crime victimization in PNG (Guthrie 2008c).

The sectoral approach

Sectoral reforms included a more integrated approach to law and justice policy, changes to agency management systems, increased budgets, and improved
performance monitoring (the sector website <www.lawandjustice.gov.pg> contains on-going developments). The LJSP focus on capacity building was predominantly delivered by long-term advisers working with agencies in Port Moresby (National Planning & Monitoring, National Judicial Staff Services, Justice & Attorney General, Royal PNG Constabulary, Correctional Services, Magisterial Services and the Ombudsman Commission) and running a sectoral coordination body (the Law & Justice Sector Secretariat). The sectoral approach itself was problematic, as a number of comments in the ICR demonstrated: ‘sector wide approaches … are still experimental and cutting edge today and this was especially true at the start of this program … Within the global context this is a very different and innovative approach and one which required fundamentally different program processes, structures, operational procedures, management structures, engagement processes and M&E assessment approaches from those of the past’ (Murphy & Gramckow 2010, p. 12). The effect was that, ‘... neither the sector, nor the contractor nor AusAID could clearly predict or fully understand what a sector approach would mean concretely in terms of responsibilities, authorities and human resource requirements and how this would impact their operations and relations. The willingness of AusAID to take this leap of faith into exploring a very different way of engagement is remarkable, as is the sector’s early recognition of the value of taking a sector wide approach … it is not surprising that some contractor management and support activities and several program activities did not meet high effectiveness marks’ (p. 12).

A critical issue was whether the approach made a difference to service delivery. The ICR criticized inefficiency and inflexibility by Cardno ACIL, especially in the Program’s early years (pp. 17-19). Even after six years, service delivery outcomes were problematic: ‘LJSP was highly relevant to higher level objectives of the aid program … but somewhat less relevant to the context and needs of end-users of law and justice system (p. vii) …. More visible impacts can be obtained by providing support for strengthening service delivery capacities at the same time as support for corporate capacities …. The program would have benefited from a strong early focus on strengthening agencies’ capacities to identify their target beneficiaries, evaluate their service delivery and develop and implement systems for monitoring and reporting meaningfully on their service delivery’ (p. viii). In any case, the sectoral approach remained completely aid-dependent: ‘all major sector operations … continue to be fully funded by the program and would not [be] sustainable if funding ceased’ (p. vii).

Despite these comprehensive problems, the ICR weighed the sectoral approach positively in its report (p. 12). In support, it gave examples of sectoral experimentation in somewhat different developing countries where, as in PNG, significant problems existed with absorptive capacity (pp. 12-14). However, its leap in faith was justified primarily with the assertion that the single most important factor in assessing its relevance was that the sectoral approach was a homegrown initiative predating the LJSP (pp. 14-15) – an issue to which we will return.
A more rigorous approach to evaluating the merits of the sectoral approach’s effectiveness comes from an assessment of whether the capacity building designated as the LJSP’s Purpose had developmental outcomes beyond the sectoral agencies. The sectoral reforms included efforts to measure systematically sector performance and community crime victimization, of which the surveys were part. An initial priority was the reduction of crime in urban areas, beginning with Port Moresby, and an expressed concern of a committee of the heads of the sectoral agencies was to obtain reliable data to measure whether urban crime was increasing in Port Moresby and nationally. Data from the surveys provides an evidence-based assessment of whether LJSP impacts might have included a reduction in urban crime victimization.

PNG crime victimization surveys

The surveys took a grounded approach that allowed patterns to emerge inductively from the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Leedy 1997, pp. 162-165). The research was deliberately atheoretical because its role was to provide information for decision-makers who had their own conceptual frameworks. They were interested in empirical generalizations that could lead to practical action rather than in theoretical issues or detailed criminological analysis to establish causal patterns in the behaviour of criminals and their victims. Each survey was independent and expressed no hypotheses about any town being part of national patterns in type or frequency of victimization, or that levels co-varied across the country. The assumption was that each baseline survey in a particular town gave a start to measuring longitudinal trends in that town. This article tests this assumption by investigating whether nation-wide similarities existed, or whether the frequency of household crime victimization was localised (which is pertinent to any further assumption that capacity building of sectoral headquarters in Port Moresby might have reduced crime elsewhere).

The survey methodology, from sociology and urban geography, provided citywide levels and trends in household crime victimization, using random household cluster samples to monitor perceptions of crime and the sector agencies and to make estimates about types and levels of victimization.

According to the then latest Census in 2000, PNG’s population was only 13% urban (National Statistical Office 2002). The country had 25 towns and cities with populations above 1500, the surveys being conducted four times in Port Moresby, three times each in Arawa and Buka, twice in Lae, and once each in Goroka, Kainantu, Kokopo and Mt Hagen (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 7-10). These towns covered 72% of the PNG urban population, with the repeat surveys covering 63%. While policy reasons determined the survey locations, the outcome was that the eight sample towns were statistically representative of town size and regional distribution. To ensure a high level of reliability, all surveys used the same fieldwork protocols and quality assurance procedures to collect 6781 interviews in 2683 households. Sample numbers were from 290 to 1003 per survey, from a range encompassing 105 to 284 households. Three of the 16 samples overrepresented the married and the tertiary educated, so analysis used population estimates based on age and gender only; otherwise
sample sizes and demographics were acceptable for generalizations about each urban population.

Twelve separate reports and a synthesis report contain the results (see Survey Reports at the end of this article). Full background on methodology is in Findlay et al. 2005a, pp. 68-95. Appendix C of each subsequent survey report provides details for that particular study (see also Guthrie 2007a, 2007b). The data is in the public domain on CD-ROMs (Davis et al. 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Complementing the surveys was a study of transport crime on the Highlands Highway (Guthrie 2007c), a separate impact evaluation of the YLM urban safety community project allied to the 2006 Port Moresby survey (Guthrie & Laki 2007), and two studies of crime affecting businesses in Port Moresby in 2004 and Lae in 2008 (Findlay et al. 2008; Guy 2009).

Estimations from the 2005 Lae survey found that only about one crime victimization in 50 (2.3%) was reported to the police. The clear indication was that police statistics greatly underestimated crime because of lack of reporting by the public, and that survey data was more reliable (Guthrie, Hukula & Laki 2007a, pp. 30-32).

**Crime victimization**

With reliable data providing a widespread overview, were there nationwide patterns in type and frequency of crime victimization? The surveys avoided any assumptions of normalcy, so non-parametric statistics were used. First, to test whether or not reports of types of crime were similar, the percentage scores for each town for each survey were ranked for each of ten indicators of individual and household crime victimization (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 14-17). The Kendall Coefficient of Concordance was $W=0.87$, which was a statistically significant correlation among all the towns ($X^2=130.0, df=15, p>.001$), i.e. they had consistent types of crime victimization.

However, the frequency with which the various crimes occurred was very different. Separately, all ten indicators were tested for differences from the mean score of all the surveys combined. A significant difference from the mean would demonstrate that the towns varied from the national level. The chi square result was $p>.001$ in all ten tests, i.e. the towns did have very different levels of urban safety compared to the national mean. According to their most recent surveys, rank sum scores gave four closely matched pairs:

1. Kainantu in 2008 and Mt Hagen in 2006 had very high levels of victimization.
2. Goroka and Lae in 2008 had high levels.
3. In 2007, Port Moresby and Kokopo had moderate levels.
4. By 2006, Arawa and Buka had very low levels compared to the other towns.

The following details the four most independent indicators (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 18-20, 23-25).
1: Individual the victim of at least one crime

The first key indicator measured the percentage of adults who reported that they had been the victim in the previous 12 months of at least one of 12 types of crime. Across all towns, about one adult in five was victimized in any one year. The columns in Graph 1 show that the highest scoring city was Mt Hagen in 2006: 41% of adults reported that they were victims. The middlemost city was Port Moresby in 2005, with 21%. The lowest scoring town was Buka in 2006 at 10%. The mean of all the surveys was 20.9%. The differences were highly significant when the survey scores were tested against the national mean ($X^2=49.3, df=15, p>.001$), i.e. the towns had very different levels of individual victimization compared to the national level.

Graph 1 Individual the victim of at least one crime

The percentages in the graph underestimate the level of individual victimization because, on average, each victim was victimized about three times. Repeat victimization ranged from 1.3 times in Arawa in 2006 to 5.9 times in Kainantu in 2006.

2: Household the victim of at least one crime

A second key indicator measured the percentage of households where residents reported that at least one household member had been the victim of at least one of the 12 types of crime in the previous 12 months. Given a national average household size of 8.0 in the surveys, figures for household victimization were much higher than for individuals separately. Graph 2 shows that the range was from a very high 86% of households in Kainantu in 2008 to 39% in Arawa in 2006. Again, the middlemost city was Port Moresby, with 63% in 2006. Arawa and Buka both decreased from 2004-2006, with Arawa in 2006 lowest at 39%.
The national mean was 64.4%. The differences from the mean were highly significant ($X^2=50.3, df=15, p>.001$), i.e. the towns had very different levels of household victimization compared to the national level.

**Graph 2 Household the victim of at least one crime**

Table 1 highlights the differences among the highest, middlemost and lowest scoring towns. Only 14% of Kainantu respondents reported in 2008 that their households had not been a victim of crime in the previous 12 months. Port Moresby in 2006 had 37% not victimized. Arawa in 2006 had a relatively high 61% and much lower levels of repeat victimization.

**Table 1 Household victimization levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Victimization (No.)</th>
<th>Kainantu 2008 (%)</th>
<th>Port Moresby 2006 (%)</th>
<th>Arawa 2006 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 times</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more times</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3: **Household the victim of property crime**

A third key indicator separated out property crime from the 12 categories to provide the mean percentage of households affected by *each one* of five types
of property crime in the previous 12 months. Combining the crimes cancelled out any effect from different categorization that might have occurred among respondents (e.g. in not distinguishing consistently between stealing and breaking and stealing). The highest level was in Kainantu, with 35% of households in 2008 having victims of property crime. This was twice the national mean of 17.6% (Graph 3). Port Moresby in 2005 was the middlemost town, with 15%. Arawa in 2006 was the lowest, at 5%. Arawa and Buka both decreased from 2004-2008. The differences from the mean were highly significant ($X^2=68.7, df=15, p>.001$).

Graph 3 Household the victim of property crime

![Graph 3 Household the victim of property crime]

4: Household the victim of violent crime

The fourth key indicator categorized violent crime victimization, which was defined as the mean percentage of each one of seven types of violence combined in the last 12 months. Graph 4 shows that Kainantu was again the highest, with 20% of households in 2008 having victims of violence. Port Moresby and Kokopo in 2007 and Goroka in 2008 were the middlemost towns, all with 8%. Three surveys in Arawa and Buka were the lowest at 1% each. The national mean was 7.5%. Like the other indicators, the differences from the mean were highly significant ($X^2=62.1, df=15, p>.001$).

While the surveys found that fear of violent crime was very high, property crime was actually far more frequent (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 26). On average across the country, property crime occurred over twice as often as violent crime, with a ratio of 2.3 households victimized by property crime to each one with violent crime victimization. During the surveys, informal comments were made occasionally to the researchers that petty theft was not a ‘real’ crime: either it was a traditionally derived behaviour because private ownership was not a
feature of tribal life; or it was so common as to be part of daily life and not really a crime. Nonetheless, in all the surveys interview comments about the most troubling crimes showed that stealing was a constant irritation. For example, in Arawa in 2006, stealing was the crime most frequently identified (by 44% of respondents) as their most troubling crime in the previous 12 months. Of 72 reasons given for crimes being the most troubling, 49% (35) were about stealing (Guthrie, Hukula & Laki 2007d, p. 25), e.g.

- I paid a lot for the bicycle.
- Those bags of dry beans were worth K1000.
- When I recovered the property, it was damaged.
- They stole our clothes on the line.
- People lack respect for others' belongings.

Graph 4 Household the victim of violent crime

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns = %  PNG Mean = 7.5%

Change over time

To investigate whether there was longitudinal change nationally during the LJSP, Table 2 shows the annual scores for the four indicators used above together with the national mean for each indicator (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 32-35). National crime victimization affecting individuals and households did not change significantly in the five years from 2004-2008; nor did property and violent crime victimization levels.

Assessment of the towns that had more than one survey was consistent with lack of change, although not as clear cut. Port Moresby did not change significantly from 2004-2007 on any of the four key indicators. There were too few Lae scores to meet the conditions of the statistical test, but inspection of the
data shows very similar results in 2005 and 2008. In contrast, both Arawa and Buka had large reductions.

Table 2 National crime victimization survey scores, 2004-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator (%)</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>PNG Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual the victim of at least 1 crime</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household the victim of at least 1 crime</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household property crime</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household violent crime</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Locational patterns**

Each crime victimization indicator showed three main locational patterns, most clearly seen in Graph 2. One was that the towns connected along the Highlands Highway (Lae, Kainantu, Goroka and Mt Hagen) consistently had the highest levels of crime. The second was that Port Moresby’s crime victimization levels were actually close to the national average. Third, Arawa and Buka in Bougainville both had considerable reductions in crime victimization from 2004-2007. Kokopo tended to be an exception that was particularly prone to theft, possibly because of good road access from the surrounding countryside.

1. **Highlands highway towns**

The Highlands Highway is the single most important road in PNG. It is vulnerable to crime, allied research estimating the cost to the heavy trucking industry at 15.3% of operational costs in 2005 (Guthrie 2007c, pp. 47-53). The victimization surveys included three of the six provincial capitals joined by the Highway (Lae, Mt Hagen and Goroka) and a district headquarters (Kainantu) with a widespread reputation among police and public for lawlessness associated large-scale marijuana growing in nearby areas.

All four surveys along the Highway found very high levels and similar types of crime victimization, higher than in any other part of the country (Guthrie & Laki 2008, pp. 16-23). Graph 5 shows a similar pattern for indicators in the each town. From 27-41% of individuals and from 78-86% of households in the towns were victim of at least one crime. From 26-35% were affected by each of five forms of property crime. From 8-20% were affected by each of seven forms of violent crime. The most affected town was Kainantu, then Mt Hagen, Goroka and coastal Lae. In 2008, an extraordinary 39% of households in Kainantu had been victims of firearm use during the previous 12 months.
Open-ended data from questionnaires in these towns showed community concerns about drugs, which were not commented on frequently elsewhere (Guthrie & Laki 2008, pp. 30-31). The data suggested that in Kainantu the major issue for the public was the violence associated with the growing and distribution of drugs rather than drug use as such, as indicated by the following brief interview comments:

- Drugs play a major role.
- My movement is always restricted by drug abusers.
- The police are drug bodies so the community don’t respect them.

The last comment reflected very negative perceptions of police service delivery held in all the Highway towns (Guthrie & Laki 2008, pp. 52-63). High levels of reporting of crimes to other forms of authority showed the strength of community ties in all towns and contributed to arguments for the police to work with and strengthen community-based crime prevention mechanisms.

2: Port Moresby

The capital city has the highest profile internationally and a major reputation for crime. However, the previous graphs showed that its crime victimization levels were only about average by PNG standards. Nor were its overall crime levels increasing. Table 3 shows that none of the four key indicators changed significantly over the four-year period (Guthrie 2008a, pp. 19-22). Violent crime affecting households in Port Moresby as a whole from 2004-2007 was steady between 7-9%, and any variation was not significant. Likewise, property crime victimization varied between 12-18%. Despite being the centre of national government and aid efforts to reduce crime, the overriding finding for
Port Moresby from 2004-2007 was that small changes in crime victimization were not statistically significant.

Table 3 Summary victimization indicators, Port Moresby 2004-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator (%)</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual the victim of at least 1 crime</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household the victim of at least 1 crime</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household property crime</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household violent crime</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considerable fluctuations within the city did occur, however. Fluctuations could be measured reliably because Port Moresby had a two-stage area sample with eight randomly sampled sites that were representative of types of living areas in Port Moresby (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 22-25). The sites ranged from high-security urban houses and apartment buildings (Town), through medium security houses in three suburbs (Tokarara, Gerehu 2 and Renbo), to low-security migrant settlements (Gordons Ridge/Erima, East Boroko and Nine Mile) and a traditionally-based village (Vabukori). Property crime victimization fluctuated within and between the sites, while Port Moresby as a whole was quite steady (Graph 6). In this graph, the site lines are very difficult to follow because they fluctuate and overlap, which is the message: changes within and between different areas in Port Moresby were considerable, apparently random and localised.

Graph 6 Household property crime victimization within Port Moresby, 2004-2007
Similar to property crime, Graph 7 demonstrates that violent crime victimization also fluctuated from year to year within sample sites. It was not possible to measure fluctuations within the other towns, but the pattern of localized, unpredictable, apparently random victimization appeared consistent with them.

**Graph 7** Household violent crime victimization within Port Moresby, 2004-2007

The finding of stable overall levels of victimization did not support impressions of increasing crime partly generated by media campaigns and gossip. During 2007, the two national newspapers, *The National* and the *Post-Courier*, ran campaigns against crime, especially sexual violence, and the media contained many perceptions about increases in violent crime. Another influence on fear levels is that PNG has a strong oral culture. Stories and gossip about local crimes spread fast through informal networks. Whether or not the stories are objectively true, repetition soon makes them social facts. However, survey data demonstrates that caution should be exercised over such perceptions. Violent and property crime fluctuated within and between the separate areas sampled in Port Moresby, but the city average was steady. In other words, perceived increases in violent crime in Port Moresby were consistent only with random fluctuations within different parts of the city rather than from statistically significant underlying changes. Media reported the ‘outbreaks’ of crime, but not the decreases, leading to a false impression of constant increase rather than localised fluctuations around the city average.

Likewise, perceptions of settlements as lawless (e.g. Hawksley 2006, p. 169) appeared partly misplaced, life there being apparently no more violent than in high security areas (Guthrie 2008c, pp. 27-33). Overall, from 2004-2007 the mean violent crime levels in the medium and high security areas within Port
Moresby (Town and the three suburbs) were not significantly different from the low security areas (the village and three settlements) ($X^2=4.05, df=3, p=.26$).

Like the Highway towns, all the Port Moresby surveys found many negative perceptions of the police. Considerable numbers believed that many police were violent and unfair, so that a considerable sense of mistrust existed within communities. Open-ended questions highlighted police ineffectiveness, poor response times, drunkenness, violence and bribe taking (Guthrie 2008a, pp. 72-73).

3: Bougainville

At the start of these surveys, an implicit assumption held in the Bougainville Administration was that the legacy of the civil war in the 1990’s would mean higher crime victimization than elsewhere in PNG. In fact, the 2004 victimization levels in Arawa and Buka were nearly all lower than Port Moresby in the same year. In distinct contrast, reductions in crime victimization then occurred in the two Bougainville towns from 2004-2006, as Table 4 shows (Guthrie, Hukula & Laki 2007d, pp. 27-32). Eighteen of their 20 indicators of crime victimization reduced each year, ten by statistically significant amounts.

Table 4 Summary victimization indicators, Bougainville 2004-2006

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual the victim of at least 1 crime</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household the victim of at least 1 crime</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household property crime</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household violent crime</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in bold = statistically significant reductions from 2004-2006 at the .05 level.

The survey findings were a highly encouraging sign of improvement in post-conflict life in both Arawa and Buka. The changes were indicative of underlying trends attributable to long-term peace initiatives and to recent governmental developments. The civil war and the activities of the RPNGC in it meant that policing was a very delicate matter in Bougainville, to which the post-war administration responded by developing an unarmed community police force. Community mechanisms did remain the first recourse for the public in Arawa and Buka, and community responsibility seemed to contribute to the decreases in crime victimization, but the new policing role was generating positive reactions in both towns (Guthrie, Hukula & Laki 2007d, pp. 51-54). In Arawa in 2006, 350 comments were made about the police and in
Buka 142 were made. A large majority (90% in Arawa and 73% in Buka) accepted a police role and wanted effective policing, for example in Arawa:

- *At this time, I think the police should be given more power.*
- *The community need help from the police.*
- *That is what police are for – to bring law and justice.*

**Policy implications**

Overall, the empirical findings were very clear. People across the country were vulnerable to the same types of crime, but some towns were safer than others. Overall, towns connected by the Highlands Highway were the least safe. Port Moresby had average levels of urban safety, while the two Bougainville towns became the safest during the period of the surveys. A corollary of the absence of a representative national level of victimization is no indication that changes in one town (say Port Moresby, whether from sectoral programs or other factors) would be reflected in changes elsewhere. One important policy implication was that, in the absence of effective governance across the country and of an integrated national economy, crime levels and their management were localised phenomena. While Port Moresby was the highest priority in the sectoral strategy, its crime victimization levels were lower than in Highway towns, and these towns especially needed increased resources and further assistance for the police and for community action.

National average levels of victimization of individuals and households did not change significantly from 2004-2008; nor did national property and violent crime victimization levels. Victimization levels in Port Moresby as a whole were also stable, neither indicating that the sectoral approach might have had a flow-on effect in lowering victimization, nor supporting the impression of increasing crime in part generated by media campaigns. Nor did victimization in Port Moresby settlements appear to be more violent than in the gated communities and security compounds.

Possibly the ineffectiveness of the sectoral approach in reducing crime victimization in Port Moresby was because of inadequate attention to practices based in community culture. Only Town (with a high proportion of company apartments, high-level government residences and expatriates) relied primarily on barrier security and private security companies. In the suburbs, community groups revolved primarily around the churches, although with some other efforts to establish activities like Neighbourhood Watch. Especially in settlements, adaptive mechanisms derived from long-standing dispute resolution methods appeared to provide some control over minor crime. Could appropriate solutions be based in restorative justice (Dinnen 1997; Macdonald 2008) and village courts (Goddard 2002)? This issue is additionally relevant given the widespread distrust in the police in all the surveys. However, while the surveys invariably found that community dispute resolutions were the prime recourse for residents across the country, these mechanisms had limited scope.
Authority embedded in extended family, language group, friendship and church networks had many informal roles in social control. The impression from conducting fieldwork in the Port Moresby settlements was that they were transplanted and adapted villages, closer in nature to village Vabukori than to the suburbs, and far closer in layout and appearance to rural villages in PNG than to urban slums in other countries (Guthrie 2008a, p. 61). Ethnic areas within the four low security locations in Port Moresby had social structures with acknowledged leaders whose roles included having a constant presence, dealing with minor problems as they arose, and negotiating with other leaders to prevent problems between groups escalating. Nine Mile was particularly notable for its organization into 15 mainly ethnic areas. In Gordons Ridge, an active Peace & Good Order Committee met weekly in a public place to deal with community issues. East Boroko contained two distinct ethnic groups that dealt with their own problems. In Vabukori, the dominant community groups were the churches, which held various weekly meetings that included discussions of community relationship issues. Goddard’s (2002, pp. 5-6) picture of Erima (which coincidently was part of one of the survey sample sites) is typical enough of the other settlement and village sites: ‘It is a volatile habitat, since it contains a mixed population of migrant background from many regions of the country competing for housing and jobs and forced to share restricted space. Regional groups form enclaves within its general boundaries, and try to get along with their neighbours as best they can. Violent confrontations are common especially when alcohol consumption exacerbates chronic friction among diverse and mutually suspicious ethnic groups’. This description also fit to a considerable extent the suburban areas surveyed, and the crime victimization data indicated that, although there was considerable volatility, the long-term level of crime victimization was no higher in the low security settlements than in the medium security suburbs and the high security town area. Variations on the same pattern seemed to occur in other survey towns, although the researchers spent less time there and were in less of a position to observe them.

The limitation in these urban areas was that restorative justice options were relevant only to less serious crimes and to ones where the offender was a member of the community rather than an outsider over whom little, if any, social control could be wielded. Communities appeared to refer only serious cases to the police, those they could not resolve themselves, or cases where the offenders were outsiders or unknown. The policy implications were two. Support for community mechanisms was appropriate to decrease the low-level crime that was a constant irritant in daily life, but the mechanisms would likely remain limited in their effects on serious crime and crime committed by people from outside the neighbourhood. Government and aid interventions thus needed considerably more attention to the effectiveness of police services in towns.

By far the most positive finding from the surveys was the increase in urban safety in Bougainville, which was related in part to the development of an unarmed community police force. However, Bougainville was a special case that provided only a partial precedent for service delivery elsewhere. The preconditions for its success included a decade of civil war, extensive
international assistance for peace and reconciliation, large-scale public reaction to the violence of the war, and major political change (Guthrie, Hukula & Laki 2007d, pp. 12-13; Hawksley 2006, pp. 167-169). All this appeared to add up to a deep-rooted desire for change within Bougainville that was not apparent elsewhere in PNG, where resignation about crime appeared to be more the norm.

Conclusion

Did the LJSP sectoral focus on institution strengthening have the effect of moving towards a more just, safe and secure society for all people in PNG? Was there a flow-on effect to service delivery that might have contributed to a reduction in crime victimization in the community? The national and Port Moresby surveys provided clear evidence that crime victimization did not reduce significantly from 2004-2008. This is consistent with an ICR finding that, ‘in practice … the LJSP placed strong emphasis on improving the work of the national level agencies within the sector, resulting in less attention to promoting restorative justice and sub-national service delivery’ (Murphy & Gramckow 2010, p. 16). The ICR also found that activities focused on local level activities outside Port Moresby, such as village courts, model court operations and legal aid, became effective largely only during the last year of the Program. Thus, despite expenditure on the LJSP of AUD150 million, service delivery outcomes did not reach the community, which was an important developmental outcome recognized in its own design documentation. Unsurprisingly, the first lesson learned by the ICR (pp. 28-29) was a need for a service delivery focus in future activities, especially at sub-national levels.

However, the ICR justified continued support for the sectoral approach with the assertion that the single most important factor in assessing its relevance was that it was a homegrown initiative. Given the influence of Australian aid projects in PNG, this assertion needs supporting evidence. In any case, parallel examples of failed homegrown but ill-considered experimentation with progressive educational reforms in PNG also raise questions about whether an aid initiative is desirable merely because it is apparently local (Guthrie 2012).

The sectoral reforms and agency management changes primarily had organizational functions. The effect of the LJSP was that many of the activities under the sectoral approach might have made bureaucratic sense, but they were unsustainable and did not have any apparent outcome reducing household crime victimization. The failure by LJSP to achieve significant progress in this direction implies that, local or not, the bureaucratic sectoral approach was a diversion from the real community issues.

Survey reports


Other references


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